Retirement Tax Incentives Are Ripe for Reform
Current Incentives Are Expensive, Inefficient, and
Inequitable
By Chuck
Marr, Nathaniel
Frentz, and Chye-Ching
Huang
December 13, 2013 - Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
Costing well over $100 billion a year, tax incentives for retirement plans
such as pensions, 401(k)s, and individual retirement accounts (IRAs) are one of
the largest federal tax expenditures. Yet they appear to do little,
relative to their high cost, to accomplish their goal of encouraging new
saving.
The main reason is that the bulk of their benefits go to higher-income
households; in 2013, some 66 percent of the benefits of the retirement tax
incentives went to the 20 percent of taxpayers with the highest incomes.
These higher-income taxpayers are likely to save substantial amounts
anyway for retirement and other purposes, and they are likely to
respond to retirement tax incentives primarily by shifting existing assets into
tax-preferred accounts rather than by undertaking additional saving.[1]
Meanwhile, the bottom 20 percent of households receive just 2 percent
of the benefits of retirement tax incentives, even though low-income people are
the least likely to have savings and the most likely to need tax incentives to
save for retirement (see Figure 1). To ensure sufficient savings during
retirement, therefore, current tax incentives are poorly targeted and
inefficient.
Retirement Tax Expenditures Are Expensive
The primary retirement savings incentives allow people to contribute to
retirement accounts, such as a traditional 401(k) or IRA plan, on a pre-tax
basis. That is, taxpayers can defer all taxes on retirement contributions
and earnings until they withdraw the money in retirement,[2] at which point it is taxed as ordinary income.
Part of the reason that this subsidy is substantial is that average tax rates tend to
be lower in retirement, both because on average, retirees have less income than
before retirement, and because Social Security income is taxed at lower rates
than are wages and salaries. A person generally needs less income in
retirement to maintain the same standard of living, in part because itfs no
longer necessary to save for retirement or pay work-related expenses, and also
because most people who are retired donft incur substantial child-rearing costs.
(The principal exception is in the health care area; a small percentage of
retired people can face catastrophic health care costs as a result of the lack
of a limit in Medicare on out-of-pocket costs and the costs that people can face
for nursing home or other institutional care.)
With gRothh IRAs and Roth 401(k)s, the tax treatment is reversed:
contributions are taxed, but neither the growth of the assets in these
accounts over time as they produce earnings, nor the withdrawals made in
retirement, are subject to tax. Taxpayers choose the type of retirement
vehicle that benefits them most over time. For example, they will likely
choose a Roth-type account rather than a traditional account if their tax
savings in retirement will exceed their upfront tax payments.
The total of all assets in defined contribution and IRA retirement plans is
estimated to be over $10 trillion in 2013.[3]
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates[4] that tax breaks for retirement contributions and
earnings will be the second-largest tax expenditure over the next decade,
costing $137 billion in 2013 and $2 trillion over 2014-2023. These
estimates are based on January 2013 figures from the Joint Committee on
Taxation, which estimated the revenue loss from individual tax provisions as
shown in Table 1.[5]
By CBOfs estimate, these incentives will cost the federal government more
than all veteransf programs combined — from veteransf disability compensation
and veteransf pensions to veteransf health care, which together will cost $1.7
trillion over the decade. They will also cost more than the costs of the
Departments of Transportation and Education combined ($1.6 trillion over the
decade).
Subsidies gTilt Heavily Toward the Top,h According to CBO
The benefit from the deferral on retirement contributions is tied to a
taxpayerfs marginal tax rate and thus rises as household income increases.
For example, someone making $40,000 and in the 10 percent tax bracket
receives an upfront tax subsidy of 10 cents per dollar of deductible retirement
contributions, whereas someone who makes $450,000 and is in the 35 percent
bracket receives an upfront subsidy of 35 cents on the dollar.
As
a result, the benefits from retirement savings tax expenditures gtilt heavily
toward the top,h as a recent CBO report explains.[6]
- The top 20 percent of households receive nearly twice as much in
retirement tax subsidies as the bottom 80 percent combined.
- As a share of income, the subsidies are worth on average 2½ times as
much for the people in the top fifth of households as for the people in
the middle fifth, and five times as much as for the people in the bottom fifth
(see Figure 2).
Contribution Limits Affect a Small Percentage of Workers
The tax code limits the amounts that taxpayers (and employers on behalf of
their workers) can contribute to tax-preferred savings accounts each year. These
contribution limits have become considerably more generous as a result of the
Bush tax cuts,[7] which raised the limits and allowed additional
gcatch-uph contributions for people aged 50 and above. In 2013, a worker
can put $17,500 into a 401(k) tax-free ($23,000 if the worker is 50 or older).[8] But the employer can make its own contributions,
and the combined employee and employer limit is $51,000 ($56,500 if the worker
is 50 or older). The annual contribution limit to IRA accounts is $5,500
($6,500 for people aged 50 or older). (See Table 2.) Deposits to
defined-benefit pension accounts (as opposed to defined-contribution plans, such
as 401(k)s) are also tax free.
These
increases in the contribution limits overwhelmingly benefit people high on the
income scale, for three reasons. First, most other Americans who
contribute to retirement accounts contribute much smaller amounts and donft
approach the limits. The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center has noted that
the increase in the contribution limits enacted over the past decade gbenefit
few workers because most contribute well below the old maximum.h[9]
Second, the higher an individualfs tax bracket, the greater the tax
subsidy that he or she receives for contributions.
The third reason that the benefit of the higher contribution limits is so
skewed to the top is that only about half of families even have retirement
accounts,[10] and higher-income families are far more likely to
have such accounts than families lower on the income scale, as Figure 3 shows.
Low- and modest-income workers tend to have less access to work-based
retirement plans,[11] either because their employer does not offer a plan
or because they may work part time and donft qualify for their employerfs plan.
In addition, those low- and modest-income workers who do have access to
work-based plans tend to participate less often,[12] in part because they often live paycheck to paycheck
and feel they canft afford to make retirement contributions out of their modest
earnings, and in part because the tax subsidies they receive for retirement
contributions are small.
Among
workers who participate in retirement plans, only a small percent are
constrained by contribution limits. Only 5 percent of participants
contribute the maximum amount to a 401(k),[13] and those are primarily the participants with higher
incomes, as Figure 4 shows.[14] (The percentage of IRA participants making the
maximum contribution to an IRA is higher, but only 7 percent of all workers
participate in such plans.[15] )
The impact of the current, high contribution limits remains heavily skewed by
income when one looks at workers overall, as Figure 5 indicates, just as when
one looks at workers who participate in such plans.
Moreover, those investors who are constrained by the contribution
limits face no restrictions on the total amount of money that can accrue within
retirement accounts on a tax-deferred basis (as the example of Governor Romney[16] illustrated). Indeed, some investment
strategies can result in extremely affluent individuals receiving high returns
on large sums placed in such accounts that far exceed the returns that more
conventional types of investments generate. For example, some private
equity firms have allowed employees to use tax-deferred retirement accounts to
acquire interests in investment partnerships at a significantly lower valuation
than the fair market value.[17] When the investments are successful, the value
of the interests can explode; the Wall Street Journal reported last
year on one private equity co-investor who reportedly saw a 583-fold increase in
the value of an IRA investment.[18] These strategies can result in IRAs worth tens
of millions of dollars.[19] Such cases represent loopholes around the
already generous contribution caps and can result in runaway tax shelters.
Income Limits on Roth IRA Contributions Are of Limited Effectiveness
For workers who participate in a retirement plan at work, there are income
limits on the deductions for contributions made to a traditional IRA. These
limits phase out the tax deduction between $59,000 and $69,000 in income for
single filers, and between $95,000 and $115,000 in income for couples.[20]
The amount that can be contributed to a Roth IRA also phases out with
income — between $112,000 and $127,000 in income for single filers and between
$178,000 and $188,000 in income for couples.[21]
Individuals with incomes above these income limits, however, can shift large
sums (even their entire account balances) from 401(k)s and other accounts that
donft have income limits to a traditional or Roth account. They
can also shift funds from a traditional IRA to a Roth IRA. In the case of
a Roth conversion, taxes are owed on the amounts shifted into a Roth IRA, but
all subsequent earnings on the account — and all withdrawals after five years —
are entirely tax free. Such conversions can provide individuals with income far
above the income limits with an opportunity to reduce their taxes through the
Roth structure, particularly by shifting investments with the potential for a
high rate of return from accounts in which future earnings will be subject to
tax into accounts where all future earnings are tax free.
Another benefit that Roth IRAs provide to high-income households is that they
do not require any distributions based on age, unlike
other tax deferred plans such as 401(k)s and traditional IRAs, which require
people to start taking distributions from the accounts no later than age
70½.
As a result, converting large balances from 401(k) accounts to Roth accounts
can enable wealthy individuals to pass on more wealth to their heirs.[22]
Evidence Shows Low-Income Households Are the Least Prepared for
Retirement
Although high-income households receive the greatest tax incentives,
low-income households face the greatest need for additional retirement
saving. Studies find that lower-income households are, on average, much
less prepared for retirement than higher-income households (see box).
Studies Find Greatest Savings Inadequacy Among Low-Income Households
There is no consensus on the best way to measure and estimate the adequacy
of household retirement-savings,a but studies using a variety of
methods consistently find that lower-income households are much less prepared
for retirement than higher-income households and that a highly
disproportionate share of the households with inadequate retirement savings
are found in the lower part of the income distribution:
- Karl Scholz of the University of Wisconsin and colleaguesb
have estimated whether people are saving goptimallyh for retirement — that
is, making the best use of their earnings during their working years to
enable them to smooth out their consumption spending over their lifetimes.
This study finds that the households at the bottom of the lifetime
earnings distribution are those most likely to have savings below their
optimal targets, and that (as Figure 1 of this paper illustrates), the
majority of those with suboptimal savings are found in lower income groups.
Eric Engen and colleagues have also used a glifecycleh approach and
found a similar pattern.c
- The Employee Benefit Research Instituted (EBRI) measures
whether a householdfs savings are sufficient to allow a benchmark level of
consumption spending in retirement, based on the householdfs prior
consumption and the expected cost of long-term care. This method
shows a greater total percentage of households with inadequate retirement
savings than the Scholz analysis does — and an even starker divergence
between low- and high-income households.
- The Center for Retirement Research at Boston Collegee compares
householdsf projected incomes with an assumed target amount needed to
maintain their pre-retirement standard of living in retirement. This
approach, which finds the highest total share of households with inadequate
retirement savings among the three analytical approaches noted here, also
shows that lower-income households are the least
prepared.f
a Congressional Budget Office, gBaby Boomersf
Retirement Prospects: An Overview,h November, 2003, http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4863/11-26-babyboomers.pdf.
b Karl Scholz, Ananth Seshadri, and Surachai Khitatrakun, gAre
Americans Saving eOptimallyf for Retirement?h Journal of Political
Economy, 2006, vol. 114, no. 4, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~scholz/Research/Optimality.pdf.
c Eric M. Engen, William G. Gale, and Cori E. Uccello,
gLifetime Earnings, Social Security Benefits, and the Adequacy of Retirement
Wealth Accumulation,h Social Security Bulletin, Vol. 66 No. 1, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n1/v66n1p38.pdf.
d Jack VanDerhei, gRetirement Income Adequacy for Boomers and
Gen Xers: Evidence from the 2012 EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model,h
Employee Benefit Research Institute, EBRI Notes Vol. 33, May, 2012, http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_05_May-12.RSPM-ER.Cvg1.pdf.
e
Alicia H. Munnell, Anthony Webb, and Francesca Golub-Sass, gThe National
Retirement Risk Index: An Update,h Center for Retirement Research, October,
2012, http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/the-national-retirement-risk-index-an-update.
f
EBRI attributes much of the difference between its results and those of the
Center for Retirement Research to EBRIfs incorporation of recent trends in
retirement savings vehicles such as automatic enrollment and escalating
contributions.
Tilt Toward High-Income Taxpayers Is Economically Inefficient
Beyond the stark inequity in subsidies and in the need for more substantial
retirement savings, the retirement tax subsidies also are economically
inefficient, because they largely subsidize behavior that would happen anyway.[23]
These subsidies increase personal saving only to the extent that they lead
people to increase their retirement contributions by consuming less or working
more, not by simply shifting existing assets from other savings or investment
vehicles into tax-preferred accounts. The subsidies thus are gupside
downh: they provide the largest subsidies to the people who are least
likely to increase their savings in response and most likely to respond to
the tax incentives by shifting savings from non-tax-preferred
investment vehicles to tax-preferred accounts. As a Brookings Institution
analysis explains, g[h]igh-income individuals are precisely the ones who can
respond to such tax incentives by reshuffling their existing assets into these
accounts to take advantage of the tax breaks, rather than by increasing their
overall level of saving.h[24]
Low-income households, on the other hand, generally have little existing
savings to shift. Accordingly, they are the group among whom nearly all
retirement contributions induced by tax incentives represent new savings.
But perversely, they are the people whom the current retirement tax
incentives benefit the least, if at all.
As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) finds, g[p]roposals that increase
retirement saving among low- and moderate-income workers could be effective in
increasing new saving because these workers typically have little or no
nonretirement saving to [shift to tax-preferred accounts].h[25] Several studies of pilot programs have shown
that additional savings tax incentives directed at low-income people are
modestly effective at increasing their savings, but only when the subsidy levels
for these people are higher than current law provides.[26]
Because the bulk of current retirement tax benefits go to high-income
taxpayers who are more likely to shift assets than to save more, the current
system does a poor job of increasing private saving and is highly inefficient.
When it comes to boosting national saving (a broader measure that
consists of saving by households, businesses, and the government — and that
reflects private saving minus government deficits or plus
government surpluses), the current system fares even worse. The large
costs of the retirement tax subsidies add to the federal deficit, so the current
system may actually reduce net national saving. As CRS has
concluded, g[c]onventional economic theory and empirical analysis do not offer
unambiguous evidence that these tax incentives have increased personal or
national saving.h[27] This is a devastating judgment, given the high
cost of these subsidies.
Conclusion
Current tax incentives for retirement saving are expensive, inequitable, and
economically inefficient, giving the largest subsidies to the people who least
need help in saving adequately for retirement and are most able to shift assets
to capture the subsidies. These subsidies are ripe for reform that can
help accomplish two important goals — raising revenue for deficit reduction and
tax-reform goals, and improving retirement saving incentives for low- and
moderate-income households, the groups with the most people who need to boost
their retirement assets. [28]
End notes:
[1] Eric M. Engen and William G. Gale, gThe effects of 401(k)
plans on household wealth: Differences across earnings groups,h Working Paper
8032, December 2000, http://www.nber.org/papers/w8032,
and Daniel Benjamin, gDoes 401(k) eligibility increase saving? Evidence from
Propensity Score Subclassification,h April 2005, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=696363.
[2] Distributions made before the recipient reaches age 59 ½
from accounts funded by pre-tax contributions are taxed at ordinary rates and
subject to an additional 10 percent penalty, though some exceptions apply, such
as withdrawals for hardships, education, and buying a first home.
[3] Barbara A. Butrica, gRetirement Plan Assets,h Urban
Institute, April, 2013, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412622-Retirement-Plan-Assets.pdf.
[4] CBO states that the tax expenditure is g[d]efined as the
difference between the current treatment of pension contributions and income and
the treatment under a pure individual income tax in which contributions were
made with after-tax income, investment earnings inside pension accounts were
taxed like ordinary investment earnings, and pension distributions were
tax-free.h Congressional Budget Office, gThe Distribution of Major Tax
Expenditures in the Individual Income Tax System,h May 29, 2013, p. 16, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43768.
[5] CBOfs aggregate estimate isnft comparable to the estimates
from JCT in that it includes the effects of retirement tax breaks on payroll tax
revenues as well as income tax revenues. Some tax expenditures related to
saving reduce both income subject to the income tax and earnings subject to
payroll taxes. Specifically, employer contributions to retirement and
pension accounts are not subject to payroll taxes and reduce earnings that would
be subject to the payroll tax.
[6] Congressional Budget Office, gThe Distribution of Major
Tax Expenditures in the Individual Income Tax System,h May 29, 2013, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43768.
The tax benefits from current retirement contributions occur over many
years. Note that CBOfs standard estimates presented here for pension
expenditures are based on the impact of all current and past contributions on
current tax revenues. CBO states that under an alternative calculation
that estimates the effects of current contributions on current and future taxes,
the distribution of benefits gdoes not differ greatly.h
[7] Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001.
[8] Internal Revenue Service, gCOLA Increases for Dollar
Limitations on Benefits and Contributions,h http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/COLA-Increases-for-Dollar-Limitations-on-Benefits-and-Contributions.
[9] Tax Policy Center, gTax Topics: Pensions and Retirement
Savings,h http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Retirement-Saving.cfm.
[10] Ana M. Aizcorbe, Arthur B. Kennickell, Kevin B. Moore,
and John Sabelhaus, gChanges in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence
from the Survey of Consumer Finances,h Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board, June 2012, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf.
[11] Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation
Survey, Employee Benefits in the United States, July 2013, p 6, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Congressional Budget Office, gUse of Tax Incentives for
Retirement Saving in 2006,h October 14, 2011, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42731.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Edward Kleinbard and Peter Canellos, gWhy Wonft Romney
Release More Tax Returns?h CNN, July 18, 2012.
[17] Mark Maremont, gBain Gave Staff Way to Swell IRAs by
Investing in Deals,h Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204062704577223682180407266.html.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Internal Revenue Service, g2013 IRA Deduction Limits —
Effect of Modified AGI on Deduction if You Are Covered by a Retirement Plan at
Work,h http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/2013-IRA-Deduction-Limits-Effect-of-Modified-AGI-on-Deduction-if-You-Are-Covered-by-a-Retirement-Plan-at-Work.
[21] Internal Revenue Service, gAmount of Roth IRA
Contributions That You Can Make For 2013,h http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Amount-of-Roth-IRA-Contributions-That-You-Can-Make-For-2013.
[22] Internal Revenue Service, gRetirement Plans FAQs
regarding Required Minimum Distributions,h http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Retirement-Plans-FAQs-regarding-Required-Minimum-Distributions.
[23] Raj Chetty, gActive vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out
in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence from Denmark,h NBER Working Paper No.
18565, November 2012.
[24] William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber, and Peter R. Orszag,
gImproving Opportunities and Incentives for Saving by Middle- And Low-Income
Households,h The Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper 2006-02, April 2006, p. 12,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2006/4/saving%20gale/200604hamilton_2.pdf.
[25] Thomas L. Hungerford and Jane G. Gravelle, gCRS Report;
IRAs: Issues and Proposed Expansion,h Congressional Research Service, February
2, 2010, http://www.aging.senate.gov/crs/pension38.pdf.
[26] See Esther Duflo et al., gSaving Incentives for
Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field Experiment with H&R
Block,h The Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 2006; gThe $aveNYC
Account, Innovation in Asset Building, Research Update December 2010,h NYC
Office of Financial Empowerment, December 2010; gThe Importance of Tax Time for
Building Emergency Savings: Major Findings from $aveNYC,h UNC Center for
Community Capital, April 2013; and Gilda Azurdia, Stephen Freedman, Gayle
Hamilton, and Caroline Schultz, gEncouraging Savings for Low- and
Moderate-Income Individuals: Preliminary Implementation Findings from the
SaveUSA Evaluation,h MDRC, April 2013.
[27] Thomas L. Hungerford and Jane G. Gravelle, gCRS Report;
IRAs: Issues and Proposed Expansion,h Congressional Research Service, February
2, 2010, http://www.aging.senate.gov/crs/pension38.pdf.
[28] Reforming retirement incentives will be the topic of a
forthcoming CBPP paper.